Zhongyuan Sun

Reading lists Stream 21Search all readings

Organizational economics

Theory of the firm, transaction costs, agency and property rights.

Of its 131 readings, 30 are assigned in two or more sources and listed first, with the number of sources beside each (in bold for the core readings, in 4 or more); the 101 listed in only one source are folded under each heading.

In the theory tree: grows out of 2 Classical foundations; leads to 22 Corporate strategy and interfirm relationships, 23 Corporate governance and upper echelons and 20 International business and multinationals.

Drawn from: Jia (USC); Sullivan (HKUST); Maoret (IESE); Levinthal (Wharton); Yiu (CUHK); Wan (CUHK); Pollock (Tennessee); Kogut & Keum (Columbia); Yao (HBS); Fiss (USC); Clough (UBC); Zhou (HKU); Peng (UT Dallas); Glaser (Alberta); Anteby (Boston University); Dobbin (Harvard). Full details of the sources are on the reading lists page.

By decade

Before 1950: 1 reading<19501950s: 0 readings1950s1960s: 1 reading1960s1970s: 6 readings1970s1980s: 13 readings1980s1990s: 33 readings1990s2000s: 49 readings492000s2010s: 24 readings2010s2020s: 3 readings2020s
Most date from the 2000s; half were published in 2001 or later.

21.1 Theory of the firm and its boundaries

  1. Coase, R. H. (1937). The Nature of the Firm. Economica, 4(16), 386–405. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x12
  2. Alchian, A., & Demsetz, H. (1972). Production, information costs, and economic organization. American Economic Review.5
  3. Hesterly, W. S., Liebeskind, J., & Zenger, T. R. (1990). Organizational Economics: An Impending Revolution in Organization Theory? Academy of Management Review, 15(3), 402. https://doi.org/10.2307/2580162
  4. Holmström, B., & Roberts, J. (1998). The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12(4), 73–94. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.12.4.732
  5. Azoulay, P. (2004). Capturing Knowledge within and across Firm Boundaries: Evidence from Clinical Development. American Economic Review, 94(5), 1591–1612. https://doi.org/10.1257/00028280430522592
  6. Gibbons, R. (2005). Four formal(izable) theories of the firm? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 58(2), 200–245. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2004.09.0102
27 more, listed in one source
  1. Arrow, K. J. (1974). The Limits of Organization. WW Norton & Company.
  2. Chandler, A. D. (1977). Introduction: The Visible Hand. In The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (pp. 1–12). Harvard University Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvjghwrj.3
  3. Winter, S. G. (1988). On Coase, Competence, and the Corporation. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036942
  4. Hart, O. (1989). An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm. Columbia Law Review, 89(7), 1757. https://doi.org/10.2307/1122818
  5. Williamson, O. E., & Winter, S. G. (Eds.). (1993). The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development. Oxford University Press (eds.). https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195065909.001.0001
  6. Barney, J. B., & Hesterly, W. (1996). Organizational Economics: Understanding the Relationship between Organizations and Economic Analysis. In S. R. Clegg, C. Hardy, & W. R. Nord (Eds.), Handbook of Organization Studies. Sage Publications.
  7. Mullin, J. C., & Mullin, W. P. (1997). United States Steel's Acquisition of the Great Northern Ore Properties: Vertical Foreclosure or Efficient Contractual Governance? Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 13(1), 74–100. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023383
  8. Bolton, P., & Scharfstein, D. S. (1998). Corporate Finance, the Theory of the Firm, and Organizations. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12(4), 95–114. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.12.4.95
  9. Gibbons, R. (1999). Taking Coase Seriously. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(1), 145–157. https://doi.org/10.2307/2667034
  10. Holmstrom, B. (1999). The firm as a subeconomy. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15(1), 74–102. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/15.1.74
  11. Freeland, R. F. (2000). Creating Holdup Through Vertical Integration: Fisher Body Revisited. The Journal of Law and Economics, 43(1), 33–66. https://doi.org/10.1086/467447
  12. Klein, B. (2000). Fisher—General Motors and the Nature of the Firm. The Journal of Law and Economics, 43(1), 105–142. https://doi.org/10.1086/467449
  13. Coase, R. H. (2000). The Acquisition of Fisher Body By General Motors. The Journal of Law and Economics, 43(1), 15–32. https://doi.org/10.1086/467446
  14. Casadesus‐Masanell, R., & Spulber, D. F. (2000). The Fable of Fisher Body. The Journal of Law and Economics, 43(1), 67–104. https://doi.org/10.1086/467448
  15. Brusoni, S., Prencipe, A., & Pavitt, K. (2001). Knowledge Specialization, Organizational Coupling, and the Boundaries of the Firm: Why Do Firms Know More than They Make? Administrative Science Quarterly, 46(4), 597–621. https://doi.org/10.2307/3094825
  16. Gibbons, R. (2005). Incentives Between Firms (and Within). Management Science, 51(1), 2–17. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0229
  17. Santos, F. M., & Eisenhardt, K. M. (2005). Organizational Boundaries and Theories of Organization. Organization Science, 16(5), 491–508. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1050.0152
  18. Jacobides, M. G., & Billinger, S. (2006). Designing the Boundaries of the Firm: From “Make, Buy, or Ally” to the Dynamic Benefits of Vertical Architecture. Organization Science, 17(2), 249–261. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1050.0167
  19. Winter, S. G. (2006). Toward a neo-Schumpeterian theory of the firm. Industrial and Corporate Change, 15(1), 125–141. https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dtj006
  20. Gibbons, R., & Roberts, J. (Eds.). (2012). The Handbook of Organizational Economics. Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1r2ggg
  21. Kapoor, R., & Adner, R. (2012). What Firms Make vs. What They Know: How Firms' Production and Knowledge Boundaries Affect Competitive Advantage in the Face of Technological Change. Organization Science, 23(5), 1227–1248. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1110.0686
  22. Alcacer, J., & Oxley, J. (2014). Learning by supplying. Strategic Management Journal, 35(2), 204–223. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2134
  23. Belenzon, S., & Tsolmon, U. (2016). Market frictions and the competitive advantage of internal labor markets. Strategic Management Journal, 37(7), 1280–1303. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2395
  24. Bennett, V. M., & Pierce, L. (2016). Motivation matters: Corporate scope and competition in complementary product markets. Strategic Management Journal, 37(7), 1304–1315. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2398
  25. Coase's theory of the firm. (2017). The Economist, July 29th, 2017.
  26. Freeland, R., & Zuckerman Sivan, E. (2018). The Problems and Promise of Hierarchy: Voice Rights and the Firm. Sociological Science, 5, 143–181. https://doi.org/10.15195/v5.a7
  27. Gartenberg, C., & Zenger, T. (2023). The Firm as a Subsociety: Purpose, Justice, and the Theory of the Firm. Organization Science, 34(5), 1965–1980. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2022.1650

21.2 Transaction cost economics

  1. Williamson, O. E. (1981). The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach. American Journal of Sociology, 87(3), 548–577. https://doi.org/10.1086/2274969
  2. Williamson, O. E. (1991). Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36(2), 269. https://doi.org/10.2307/23933565
  3. Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Anti-Trust Implications. Free Press.4
  4. Poppo, L., & Zenger, T. (2002). Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements? Strategic Management Journal, 23(8), 707–725. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2493
  5. Weber, L., & Mayer, K. (2014). Transaction Cost Economics and the Cognitive Perspective: Investigating the Sources and Governance of Interpretive Uncertainty. Academy of Management Review, 39(3), 344–363. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2011.04633
  6. Williamson, O. E. (1979). Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations. The Journal of Law and Economics, 22(2), 233–261. https://doi.org/10.1086/4669422
  7. Monteverde, K., & Teece, D. J. (1982). Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry. The Bell Journal of Economics, 13(1), 206. https://doi.org/10.2307/30034412
  8. Williamson, O. (1985). Contractual man and The governance of contractual relations. In The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Free Press.2
  9. Joskow, P. (1987). Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets. American Economic Review, 77, 168–185.2
  10. Jones, G. R., & Hill, C. W. L. (1988). Transaction cost analysis of strategy‐structure choice. Strategic Management Journal, 9(2), 159–172. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.42500902062
  11. Forbes, S. J., & Lederman, M. (2009). Adaptation and Vertical Integration in the Airline Industry. American Economic Review, 99(5), 1831–1849. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.5.18312
13 more, listed in one source
  1. Ouchi, W. G. (1980). Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans. Administrative Science Quarterly, 25(1), 129. https://doi.org/10.2307/2392231
  2. Pisano, G. P. (1990). The R&D Boundaries of the Firm: An Empirical Analysis. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1), 153. https://doi.org/10.2307/2393554
  3. Walker, G., & Poppo, L. (1991). Profit Centers, Single-Source Suppliers, and Transaction Costs. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36(1), 66. https://doi.org/10.2307/2393430
  4. Williamson, O. E. (1996). The Mechanisms Of Governance. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195078244.001.0001
  5. Oxley, J. E. (1997). Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic Alliances: A Transaction Cost Approach. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 13(2), 387–409. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023389
  6. Williamson, O. E. (1999). Strategy research: governance and competence perspectives. Strategic Management Journal, 20(12), 1087–1108. https://doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1097-0266(199912)20:12<1087::aid-smj71>3.0.co;2-z
  7. Williamson, O. E. (2000). The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead. Journal of Economic Literature, 38(3), 595–613. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.38.3.595
  8. Williamson, O. E. (2002). The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(3), 171–195. https://doi.org/10.1257/089533002760278776
  9. Whinston, M. D. (2003). On the Transaction Cost Determinants of Vertical Integration. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 19(1), 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/19.1.1
  10. Mayer, K. J., & Nickerson, J. A. (2005). Antecedents and Performance Implications of Contracting for Knowledge Workers: Evidence from Information Technology Services. Organization Science, 16(3), 225–242. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1050.0125
  11. Williamson, O. E. (2005). Transaction Cost Economics The Process Of Theory Development. In Smith & Hitt (Eds.), Great Minds in Management (pp. 485–508). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199276813.003.0023
  12. Hoetker, G., Swaminathan, A., & Mitchell, W. (2007). The impact of buyer-supplier relationships on the survival of modular and architectural component suppliers. Management Science.
  13. Giarratana, M. S., & Santaló, J. (2020). Transaction Costs in Resource Redeployment for Multiniche Firms. Organization Science, 31(5), 1159–1175. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2019.1351

21.3 Agency theory and corporate control

  1. Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of Ownership and Control. The Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 301–325. https://doi.org/10.1086/4670378
  2. Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x5
  3. Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review. Academy of Management Review, 14(1), 57. https://doi.org/10.2307/2581915
  4. Arthurs, J. D., Hoskisson, R. E., Busenitz, L. W., & Johnson, R. A. (2008). Managerial Agents Watching other Agents: Multiple Agency Conflicts Regarding Underpricing in IPO Firms. Academy of Management Journal, 51(2), 277–294. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2008.317672564
  5. Wiseman, R. M., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (1998). A Behavioral Agency Model of Managerial Risk Taking. Academy of Management Review, 23(1), 133. https://doi.org/10.2307/2591033
  6. Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Nunez-Nickel, M., & Gutierrez, I. (2001). The role of family ties in agency contracts. Academy of Management Journal, 44(1), 81–95. https://doi.org/10.2307/30693382
14 more, listed in one source
  1. Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Agency Problems and Residual Claims. The Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 327–349. https://doi.org/10.1086/467038
  2. Arrow (1985). Economics of Agency.
  3. Gomez-Mejia, L. R., & Balkin, D. B. (1992). Determinants of faculty pay: An agency theory perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 35(5), 921–955. https://doi.org/10.2307/256535
  4. Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A Survey of Corporate Governance. The Journal of Finance, 52(2), 737–783. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x
  5. Denis, D. J., Denis, D. K., & Sarin, A. (1999). Agency theory and the influence of equity ownership structure on corporate diversification strategies. Strategic Management Journal, 20(11), 1071–1076. https://doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1097-0266(199911)20:11<1071::aid-smj70>3.0.co;2-g
  6. Stiglitz, J. E. (2000). The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(4), 1441–1478. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300555015
  7. Lee, P. M., & O'Neill, H. M. (2003). Ownership structures and R&D investments of U.S. and Japanese firms: Agency and stewardship perspectives. Academy of Management Journal, 46(2), 212–225. https://doi.org/10.2307/30040615
  8. Shapiro, S. P. (2005). Agency Theory. Annual Review of Sociology, 31(1), 263–284. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.31.041304.122159
  9. Dalton, D. R., Hitt, M. A., Certo, S. T., & Dalton, C. M. (2007). The Fundamental Agency Problem and Its Mitigation: Independence, Equity, and the Market for Corporate Control. Academy of Management Annals, 1(1), 1–64. https://doi.org/10.5465/078559806
  10. Young, M. N., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G. D., & Jiang, Y. (2008). Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies: A Review of the Principal–Principal Perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 45(1), 196–220. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2007.00752.x
  11. Aghion, P., & Stein, J. C. (2008). Growth versus Margins: Destabilizing Consequences of Giving the Stock Market What It Wants. The Journal of Finance, 63(3), 1025–1058. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01351.x
  12. He, J., & Wang, H. C. (2009). Innovative Knowledge Assets and Economic Performance: The Asymmetric Roles of Incentives and Monitoring. Academy of Management Journal, 52(5), 919–938. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2009.44633414
  13. Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Neacsu, I., & Martin, G. (2019). CEO Risk-Taking and Socioemotional Wealth: The Behavioral Agency Model, Family Control, and CEO Option Wealth. Journal of Management, 45(4), 1713–1738. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206317723711
  14. Li, S., & Lu, J. W. (2020). A Dual-Agency Model of Firm CSR in Response to Institutional Pressure: Evidence from Chinese Publicly Listed Firms. Academy of Management Journal, 63(6), 2004–2032. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2018.0557

21.4 Property rights and incomplete contracts

  1. Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1990). Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy, 98(6), 1119–1158. https://doi.org/10.1086/2617292
10 more, listed in one source
  1. Coase, R. H. (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. The Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1–44. https://doi.org/10.1086/466560
  2. Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1986). The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. Journal of Political Economy, 94(4), 691–719. https://doi.org/10.1086/261404
  3. Hart, O. (1994). Firms, Contract and Financial Structure. Clarendon Press.
  4. Argyres, N. S., & Liebeskind, J. P. (1998). Privatizing the intellectual commons: Universities and the commercialization of biotechnology. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 35(4), 427–454. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-2681(98)00049-3
  5. Banerjee, A. V., & Duflo, E. (2000). Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(3), 989–1017. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300554962
  6. Baker, G., Gibbons, R., & Murphy, K. J. (2002). Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1), 39–84. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302753399445
  7. Baker, G. P., & Hubbard, T. N. (2003). Make Versus Buy in Trucking:Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information. American Economic Review, 93(3), 551–572. https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803322156981
  8. Baker, G. P., & Hubbard, T. N. (2004). Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board Computers and Governance in U. S. Trucking. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(4), 1443–1479. https://doi.org/10.1162/0033553042476152
  9. Kim, J., & Mahoney, J. T. (2005). Property rights theory, transaction costs theory, and agency theory: an organizational economics approach to strategic management. Managerial and Decision Economics, 26(4), 223–242. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.1218
  10. Gibbons, R., & Henderson, R. (2012). Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities. Organization Science, 23(5), 1350–1364. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1110.0715

21.5 Incentives, hierarchy and organizational design

  1. Aghion, P., & Tirole, J. (1997). Formal and Real Authority in Organizations. Journal of Political Economy, 105(1), 1–29. https://doi.org/10.1086/2620632
  2. Gneezy, U., Meier, S., & Rey-Biel, P. (2011). When and Why Incentives (Don't) Work to Modify Behavior. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(4), 191–210. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.25.4.1912
27 more, listed in one source
  1. Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991). Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7(special_issue), 24–52. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24
  2. Miller, G. J. (1992). Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139173742
  3. Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1994). The firm as an incentive system. American Economic Review, 84(4), 972–991.
  4. Cremer, J. (1995). Arm's Length Relationships. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(2), 275–295. https://doi.org/10.2307/2118440
  5. Stein, J. C. (1997). Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources. The Journal of Finance, 52(1), 111–133. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03810.x
  6. Frey, B., & Oberholzer-Gee, F. (1997). The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out. American Economic Review, 87(4), 746–755.
  7. Garicano, L. (2000). Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production. Journal of Political Economy, 108(5), 874–904. https://doi.org/10.1086/317671
  8. Maskin, E., Qian, Y., & Xu, C. (2000). Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form. Review of Economic Studies, 67(2), 359–378. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00135
  9. Bernardo, A. E., Cai, H., & Luo, J. (2001). Capital budgeting and compensation with asymmetric information and moral hazard. Journal of Financial Economics, 61(3), 311–344. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(01)00065-4
  10. Bresnahan, T. F., Brynjolfsson, E., & Hitt, L. M. (2002). Information Technology, Workplace Organization, and the Demand for Skilled Labor: Firm-Level Evidence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1), 339–376. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302753399526
  11. Roberts, J. (2004). Key Concepts for Organization Design. In The Modern Firm: Organizational Design for Performance and Growth (pp. 32–73). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198293767.003.0002
  12. Roberts, J. (2004). The Modern Firm: Organizational Design for Performance and Growth. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198293767.001.0001
  13. Dessein, W., & Santos, T. (2006). Adaptive Organizations. Journal of Political Economy, 114(5), 956–995. https://doi.org/10.1086/508031
  14. Rajan, R. G., & Wulf, J. (2006). The Flattening Firm: Evidence from Panel Data on the Changing Nature of Corporate Hierarchies. Review of Economics and Statistics, 88(4), 759–773. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.88.4.759
  15. Gibbons, R. (2010). Inside Organizations: Pricing, Politics, and Path Dependence. Annual Review of Economics, 2(1), 337–365. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.143304
  16. Garicano, L., & Wu, Y. (2012). Knowledge, Communication, and Organizational Capabilities. Organization Science, 23(5), 1382–1397. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1110.0723
  17. Ederer, F., & Manso, G. (2013). Is Pay for Performance Detrimental to Innovation? Management Science, 59(7), 1496–1513. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1120.1683
  18. Bloom, N., Garicano, L., Sadun, R., & Van Reenen, J. (2014). The Distinct Effects of Information Technology and Communication Technology on Firm Organization. Management Science, 60(12), 2859–2885. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2013
  19. Puranam, P., Alexy, O., & Reitzig, M. (2014). What's “New” About New Forms of Organizing? Academy of Management Review, 39(2), 162–180. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2011.0436
  20. Reitzig, M., & Maciejovsky, B. (2015). Corporate hierarchy and vertical information flow inside the firm—a behavioral view. Strategic Management Journal, 36(13), 1979–1999. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2334
  21. Garicano, L., & Rossi-Hansberg, E. (2015). Knowledge-Based Hierarchies: Using Organizations to Understand the Economy. Annual Review of Economics, 7(1), 1–30. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080614-115748
  22. Wu, Y. (2017). Authority, Incentives, and Performance: Evidence from a Chinese Newspaper. Review of Economics and Statistics, 99(1), 16–31. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00557
  23. Puranam, P. (2017). Integration of Effort. The Microstructure of Organizations. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199672363.003.0004
  24. Holmström, B. (2017). Pay For Performance and Beyond. American Economic Review, 107(7), 1753–1777. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.107.7.1753
  25. Levinthal, D. A., & Workiewicz, M. (2018). When Two Bosses Are Better Than One: Nearly Decomposable Systems and Organizational Adaptation. Organization Science, 29(2), 207–224. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2017.1177
  26. Bloom, N., Brynjolfsson, E., Foster, L., Jarmin, R., Patnaik, M., Saporta-Eksten, I., & Van Reenen, J. (2019). What Drives Differences in Management Practices? American Economic Review, 109(5), 1648–1683. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20170491
  27. Gibbons, R. (n.d.). Why Organizations Are Such a Mess (and What an Economist Might Do About It) (Section 1). unpublished.

21.6 Assessments and critiques

  1. Ghoshal, S., & Moran, P. (1996). Bad for Practice: A Critique of the Transaction Cost Theory. Academy of Management Review, 21(1), 13. https://doi.org/10.2307/2586276
  2. David, R. J., & Han, S. (2004). A systematic assessment of the empirical support for transaction cost economics. Strategic Management Journal, 25(1), 39–58. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3595
  3. Donaldson, L. (1990). The Ethereal Hand: Organizational Economics and Management Theory. Academy of Management Review, 15(3), 369. https://doi.org/10.2307/2580132
  4. Williamson, O. E. (1996). Economic Organization: The Case for Candor. Academy of Management Review, 21(1), 48. https://doi.org/10.2307/2586282
8 more, listed in one source
  1. Moran, P., & Ghoshal, S. (1996). Theories of Economic Organization: The Case for Realism and Balance. Academy of Management Review, 21(1), 58. https://doi.org/10.2307/258629
  2. Madhok, A. (2002). Reassessing the fundamentals and beyond: Ronald Coase, the transaction cost and resource‐based theories of the firm and the institutional structure of production. Strategic Management Journal, 23(6), 535–550. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.247
  3. Ghoshal, S. (2005). Bad Management Theories Are Destroying Good Management Practices. Academy of Management Learning & Education, 4(1), 75–91. https://doi.org/10.5465/amle.2005.16132558
  4. Geyskens, I., Steenkamp, J.-B. E. M., & Kumar, N. (2006). Make, Buy, or Ally: A Transaction Cost Theory Meta-Analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 49(3), 519–543. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2006.21794670
  5. Macher, J. T., & Richman, B. D. (2008). Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social Sciences. Business and Politics, 10(1), 1–63. https://doi.org/10.2202/1469-3569.1210
  6. Ferraro, F., Pfeffer, J., & Sutton, R. I. (2009). How and Why Theories Matter: A Comment on Felin and Foss (2009). Organization Science, 20(3), 669–675. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1090.0432
  7. Felin, T., & Foss, N. J. (2009). Performativity of Theory, Arbitrary Conventions, and Possible Worlds: A Reality Check. Organization Science, 20(3), 676–678. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1090.0433
  8. Felin, T., & Foss, N. J. (2009). Social Reality, the Boundaries of Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, and Economics. Organization Science, 20(3), 654–668. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1090.0431

21.7 Other readings

No reading here is assigned in more than one source.

2 readings listed in one source
  1. Hirshleifer, J., & Hirshleifer, D. (1999). Price Theory and Applications.
  2. Ostrom, E. (2010). Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems. American Economic Review, 100(3), 641–672. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.3.641